SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (U)

TO:      See Distribution 

   1. (U) Name of Operation: OPERATION BINH SON_SUPPORT.

   2. (U) Date of Operation: 030100 to 052400 December 1967.

   3. (U) Location: Chu Lai, RVN; Map references: Vietnam Scale 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheets 6739 I, 6739 IV.

   4. (C) Control and Command Headquarters:  HEADQUARTERS 198th Lt Infantry Brigade (LIB)

   5. (U) Reporting Officers:
          a.  Colonel James R. Waldie, CO, 198th LIB
          b.  LTC William J. Baxley Jr., CO, 1st Bn, 6th Inf
          c.  LTC Paul A. Roach Jr., CO, 1st Bn 52nd Inf
          d.  LTC William H. Embley, CO, 1st Bn, 14th Arty
          e.  CPT Walter E. Reasor, CO, H Troop, 17th Cav

   6. (C) Task Organization:
          a.  HQ's, 198th Light Infantry Brigade
          b.  1st Battalion, 6th Infantry
          c.  1st Battalion, 52nd Infantry
          d.  1st Battalion, 14th Artillery
          e.  H Troop, 17th Cavalry

   7.  (C) Supporting Forces:
          a.  176th Aviation Company (Airmobile Light) - provided gunships employing suppressive fires to destroy the enemy and relieve enemy pressure on the Binh Son District Headquarters.
         b.  1st Bn, 14th Artillery - provided counter-mortar, direct support, and harassing and interdicting fires to disrupt and destroy the enemy and to block his escape routes.

   8.  (C) General:
           a.  On 3 December 1967, the enemy initiated an attack against the Binh Son Military District compound (coord BS 601922), located approximately 1000 meters south of the Brigade's southern boundary (TRA BONG RIVER).  Elements of the Brigade, employed in close proximity to it's southern boundary, had sporadic engagements with enemy forces attacking the Binh Son compound and bridge across the Tra Bong River.
           b.  The Viet Cong attack on Binh Son began at 030113 December and terminated approximately 030630 December.  American advisors who were in the compound kept the Brigade TOC informed of the attack as it commenced, developed and terminated.  This information was retransmitted to the Americal
Division TOC as it was received.  Per request of the ARVN Commander and American advisors for our assistance, the Brigade requested division's approval to move elements into the Binh Son area to assist the compound.  The Brigade's requests, to employ units in the area were disapproved because the ROK Marine Brigade located south of the Tra Bong River was preparing to assist the compound and exploit the area of operations.  However, the 198th Brigade provided direct support artillery fires for targets in the 
vicinity of the Binh Son compound and defended the bridge across the Tra Bong River.  Subsequent operations were conducted by the Brigade to destroy the enemy as he withdrew from the Binh Son District area into the Brigade TAOR.

   9.  (C) Intelligence:
           a.  Weather:
               (1) The weather conditions during the period of 3 to 5 December 1967 were: generally cloudy skies with intermittent rain showers, high humidity and even temperatures averaging 76' maximum and 68' minimum.  The illumination rate was 0% on the morning of 3 December.
               (2) Effects on enemy operations:  Periods of reduced visibility favored undetected movement by enemy units.
               (3) Effects on our operations: Periods of reduced visibility and low cloud coverage (500 feet) negated the employment of Air Force flareships and miniguns on the morning of 3 December.  Employ-
ment of Army gunships (armed helicopters) was initially hindered by the periods of reduced visibility, which made it difficult to locate and identify enemy targets.

              b.  Terrain: The terrain in the area of operations varied generally from scattered low hills to large areas of flat paddy and marsh land.  The Binh Son District area is relatively flat and contains many
rice paddies and several streams formed by the Tra Bong River, and is relatively densely populated.  Population centers are widely scattered throughout the area and coincide generally with the location of
paddy land.  Hills in the area are covered with grass and brushwood, the latter being particularly characteristic of the Va Thuong Peninsula.
              c.  Enemy:
                  (1) Numerous intelligence reports indicated that the enemy had improved his strength and increased his activities south of the Brigade's southern boundary and west and southwest of the Binh Son
complex.  The intelligence liaison officer of the 198th LIB reported several times that the Binh Son Military compound could be attacked by one or two companies of the 48th Bn, the 95th Sapper Co, the P-31 Inf Co, and possibly the C-21 Sapper Company.  The American Advisory team at Binh Son acted on the intelligence reports and began preparation to increase the defensive posture of the complex; foliage was cut down and claymore mines were installed.  Coordination with ROK Marines and the 198th Bde
was made for the employment of artillery defensive concentrations and H&I fires.  Two nights prior to the attack the ROK's provided the artillery fires.
                 (2) Enemy activities (movement and contact) increased within the Brigade TAOR during the period 30 November.  A total of 19 contacts and engagements were initiated resulting in eight enemy KIA (C), and eight detainees evacuated by friendly forces.  In preparation for their attack on the Binh Son Military District HQ's, the enemy's scheme of  maneuver was probably conducted as depicted in Inclosure 1, this report.
                 (3)  Intelligence reports collected by the Order of Battle (OB) section 635th Military Intelligence Detachment indicated that an enemy attack on the Binh Son District Headquarters was imminent.  These reports are consolidated and contained in Inclosure 2, this report.

   10.  (C) Missions:
            a.  Provide security for and defend the northern approaches to the Tra Bong River bridge and prevent or defend against attacks on the bridge from the Brigade TAOR.
            b.  Per request of Binh Son Advisor (while under attack): provide artillery and gunship support in defense of Binh Son compound.
            c.  Establish blocking position within the southern portion of the Brigade TAOR and destroy the enemy as he withdraws from Binh Son.

   11.  (C) Concept of Operation:
            a.  Defense of Binh Son Bridge.  The 1st Bn, 6th Inf secured northern avenues of approach to the Binh Son Bridge by maximum use of night ambush and patrolling operations within their area of operations.
H Troop, 17th Cav provided two Armored Personnel Carriers nightly, to assist the local PF in defending the bridge and avenues of approach thereto.
            b.  Binh Son Support.  Fire requests were initially submitted directly from Binh Son to the 1-14 Arty FDC.  Requests for gunship support were initially submitted through the 1-6 Inf to the Brigade TOC
by the Binh Son Advisors; and upon approval, the Aviation Officer scrambled a team of gunships which included a flareship.
            c.  Destruction of the enemy as he withdrew from the Binh Son area was accomplished by intensified patrolling and ambush operations, and deploying elements of 1-6 Infantry and 1-52 Infantry to
establish blocking positions within the southern sectors of their areas of operations.  Prior to the deployment of blocking forces, fires were placed on likely routes of withdrawal.

   12.  (C) Execution:
            a.  2 December 1967
                (1) Approximately 021845 December, two APC's from H Troop, 17th Cav, moved into position on the south end of the Binh Son Bridge.  Their mission was to support a Popular Forces (PF) platoon in securing the bridge and to be a reaction force for OP #5 (BS 567978) if required.  One of the APC's (track 22) was positioned near the south end of the bridge and the other APC (track 23) was positioned approxmately 40 meters north of track 22.  The track commanders coordinated with the Vietnamese PF commander and initiated their communication checks with the Binh Son Compound.  From the time of their arrival in the area until the Viet Cong attack, the track commanders believed that 
something was wrong.  It was unusually quiet and the local Vietnamese civilian populace was not as active in the area as it normally had been.  They (the civilian populace) would normally be laughing and riding bycicles, playing music etc., however, they were not active in the streets that night.  The PF securing the bridge were also behaving differently.  There were only four or five PF personnel on each end of the bridge.  Usually the[y] would congregate through out the area walking back and forth,
firing into the river or playing radios and singing.  The night was much too quiet.
                (2) At 1920 hrs, the American advisory team leader, Major Willoughby informed the 1st Bn, 6th Inf that 150 Viet Cong were  located in the vicinity of coordinates BS 566916.  This information was
relayed to the Brigade TOC and the security force on the brigade [bridge].  At 1930 hours the target was cleared for fire and at 1952 hours Battery A, 1-14 Arty fired a battery TOT of three rounds on the target.  At 2003 hours the Brigade TOC requested the 1-6 Inf to determine how the 150 persons were spotted and how they were determined to be Viet Cong.  The advisory team reported through the 1-6 Inf, that the information came from a HOI CHANH.  It was confirmed by reliable intelligence agents in the area.  At 2035 hours, another report of 150 Viet Cong within the area was received from the Binh Son Military District.  Battery A, 1-14 Arty engaged the target again with 16 rounds of HE 105, and the 
3-16th Arty fired 9 rounds of HE on the target.
               b.  030001 to 032400 December.
                   (1) The enemy employed deceptive tactics in hopes of canalizing the Brigade's response and diverting its attention or its effort to exploit the developing situation at Binh Son.  Small scale attacks were 
initiated on several observation posts (OP) and one battalion command post.  At 0055 hrs, the 1-6 Inf OP at Nuc Mau BS 574961 received several rounds of small arms fire from the north, and at 0106 hours it received more small arms and M79 fires.  The 1-6 Inf reported that contact was made  at 0120 hours with an estimated ten (10) man VC force.  The enemy came within fifty (50) meters of the OP position (coordinates BS575971) and was engaged with small arms fire; results of the engagement are not 
known.  At the same time OP #8 (BS 574966) observed three (3) Viet Cong running north in the vicinity of the Nuc Mau Village.  The OP at Nuc Mau was again fired upon at 0142 hours and later (0201 hours) received more small arms fire together with OP #5 (BS567978), OP #7 (BS 577964) and the 
two APC's positioned at the bridge.  Throughout the 1-52 Inf area of  operations (AO) the enemy occasionally engaged elements of the battalion with harassing small arms, automatic weapons fires and a few mortar rounds.  At 0135 hours bunker 64 (BS630992), within the 1-52 Inf Battalion base camp, received small arms fire from 200 meters to their front.  Company C reported that their 3rd Platoon OP (BT621017) was receiving small arms fire from Son Tra (BT 621015) at 0206 hours.  Company B reported they were receiving small arms fire from the south at 0229 hours.  An ambush patrol from Company A requested illumination fires at coordinates BS 699965 (0230  hours).  When the area was illuminated, the patrol killed one (1) Viet Cong, who was wearing webbed gear and armed with M-14 rifle.  The combined  action platoons (CAP) operating within the 1-52 Inf AO had sporadic contact
with the enemy, and in one engagement, at 030141 hours, killed three (3) of the enemy.
                    (2)  At approximately 0113 hours, the first of many mortar rounds hit the center of the Binh Son District Headquarters compound.  At which time, the nine (9) American advisors were in their respective living quarters.  As the enemy mortar fires increased and continually hit their target, the Americans moved to a tower located in the center of the compound to evaluate the situation, and assist in defending the compound.  Eight of the advisors. Major Willoughby, Ltjg Sartin, Lt Slough (198th LIB, 
Intelligence LNO), Sgt Metcalf, Sgt Confer (Liaison NCO, 1-14th Arty), Sp5 Mulnick and two radio operators, Sp4 Bates and Sp4 Hatfield (Liaison Spec, 1-14th Arty) manned the positions in the tower.  The other advisor, Captain Vollentine, (team S3) went to a bunker which had a commanding view of the paddies adjacent to the compound.  He went to this position in order that he might better observe the enemy movement and adjust the requested artillery fires.  The advisors informed the 198th Inf Bde and the two APC's, positioned near the bridge approximately 500 meters northwest of the compound, of the situation, and requested artillery, gunships and AF flareships from the Brigade.
                    (3)  Shortly thereafter, one of the APC's (track 33) received enemy automatic weapons fire.  Immediately, both APC's and the PF soldiers opened fire on muzzle flashes observed approximately 300 meters west and southwest of their position.  The Popular Forces and APC's, employing .50 caliber, and M60 machineguns and M79 fire, engaged the enemy for approximately 40 minutes.  During this period, the advisor at the Binh Son compound frequently informed the APC's that the compound was receiv-
ing mortar fire.  Shortly thereafter enemy mortar fire hit near track 23.  Within the first twenty minutes of this engagement, Sgt Kemp, the commander of track 23, was hit in both legs by small arms fire.  Approx-
imately ten to fifteen minutes later, SP4 Burris, another crew member of track 23, sustained a wound in the thigh by small arms fire.  Both men were placed inside of the track on the floor, while the rest of the crew
continued firing the machine guns.  One of the crew members, SP4 Slaughter, entered the track to break out some more ammunition; at this time the enemy fired a 57mm Recoiless rifle striking the track in the upper rear.  The two men previously wounded did not sustain any additional injuries from the round, however, Sp4 Slaughter sustained a chest wound from the fragments.  His wounds did not prevent him from continuing his mission.  Another member of the crew, SP4 Smith, moved track 23 approximately 40
meters to the south.  Track 22 moved to the south entrance of the bridge behind the concertina wire emplacement.  Contiuous artillery illumination was provided commencing at 0115 hours, two minutes after the advisors' request.  No close HE missions were fired initially because advisors were unable to determine the location of Popular Forces elements.  At 0140 hours an HE fire mission was requested on grid 588930.  This mission was fired within two minutes.  After completion of this mission, the advisors reported that incoming mortar fires had ceased.  About 0215 hours the 1-6 Inf TOC informed Sgt Bandy, the track section leader, that the Brigade had sent helicopter flareships and gunships to assist them.  The gunships arrived in the area at approximately 0200 hours and maneuvered through the low cloud ceiling to engage the enemy attacking the Binh Son Compound and the bridge.  US Air Force Flareships were not used due to low cloud ceiling.  At 0224 hours the advisors reported that they were unable to contact the gunships to adjust them into the targets and that the enemy had begun firing 57mm rifle rounds into the compound.  Artillery was unable to fire at this time because gunships were in the area, and not under ground control.  At 0230 hours, mortar, recoilless rifle, grenade, satchel and small arms attacks increased tremendously.  By 0300 hours, fires were intense and advisors reported that their ammunition dump was burning.  Liberal employment of artillery and gunships supporting the two M113's prevented the attackers from destroying the bridge.  The volume of enemy fires decreased gradually to sporadic firing which cont-
inued until daylight.  See inclosure 3, (Illustration of APC's activities).
                     (4) The 198th Brigade TOC received the request for artillery and gunship support from the Binh Son advisors at approximately 0113 hours.  By 0120 hours, the Brigade TOC had initiated a request for Air Force flareships and gunships to the Americal Division TOC.  The Brigade scrambled two gunships and two flareships, and the Americal Division scrambled one gunship.  Artillery, illumination fires were on
the way at 0115 hours, within two minutes from the time the request was initiated.  Artillery and gunship fires were adjusted by the advisors and artillery liaison personnel.  Gunships were on station at the Binh
Son area at approximately 0200 hours.  However, because of low cloud ceiling, darkness and lack of advisor communication with the gunships, the gunships could only engage enemy targets of opportunity until about 0223 hours at which time the track commanders, Binh Son advisors and gunships
were able to locate enemy targets.  The suppressive fires from the artillery and gunships supported the compound.  However, enemy mortar fire and sapper attacks on the compound continued.  Although the advisors had various reports of aerial sighting of the mortar positions; it was difficult to knock out the mortars.  Later, enemy mortar fire damaged the radio antennas within the Binh Son compound causing difficulties in communication.  The advisors were still able to transmit and receive traffic by relaying through the two APC's near the bridge.  Subsequently, track 22 assumed the mission of adjusting the artillery fire west of Highway 1.  Adjustments were relayed to the artillery LNO in the 1st Bn, 6th INf TOC.  The advisors continued to direct the gunship by radio.  Both the artillery and gunship fires had some affect and caused the enemy to decrease his rate of mortar fire.
                     (5) About 0300 hours the advisors feared that the enemy was overrunning the perimeter of the compound.  Three of the advisors (Lt Slough, Sgt Metcalf and Sp4 Hatfield) took an M60 machinegun to the top level of the tower and began firing from that position.  Several Viet Cong were killed while trying to breach the concertina wire on the perimeter.  Artillery liaison personnel fired a white flare to mark the friendly position; incoming fires continued to be intense.  Suddenly, the tower took several direct hits forcing the advisors down to the second level.  As a result of these hits three of the advisors were wounded.  At 0347 hours gunships departed the area to refuel and rearm.  Artillery check fires were lifted.  At the advisors request several artillery missions were fired upon enemy location between 0439 and 0447 hours this stopped the enemy's incoming fires.  At 0509 hours mortar fires resumed.  Artillery fires commenced on suspected mortar locations and by 0523 to 0530 hours, it became possible to employ gunships to the east of Binh Son, thereby freeing artillery to fire in the Binh Son area and to the west.
The most severe part of the enemy attack was his destructive mortar fire and sapper activity which continued throughout the attack.  In the attack an enemy force overran the outer perimeter and compound, and employing  satchel charges, destroyed all of the bunkers, except two.  The advisers and artillery liaison personnel were unable to use extremely close-in, preplanned fires because they could not determine or mark the location of the Popular Force elements.  Numerous dud Chi-com grenades and satchel charges were later found inside the compound.  The damage to the compound was severe only the damaged tower from which the advisors were fighting and two bunkers remained standing.  The enemy probably was unable to place a satchel charge near the tower because it commanded the approaches, therefore, US Advisors continued to fight effectively.  The enemy continued his mortar fire until 0632 hours.  During this three hours of firing the enemy effectively evacuated all his dead and wounded from the vicinity of the 
compound.  The compound's POW camp which contained a minimum of 150 prisoners was vacant and untouched by enemy mortar fires and satchel charges.  See inclosure #4, diagram of compound.
                    (6) Destruction of the Binh Son Bridge, one of the  enemy's objectives, was not accomplished because the Popular Force and men of H Troop, 17 Cav stubbornly refused to be defeated.  Staff Sergeant Bandy, track leader, demonstrated outstanding leadership; throughout the attack.  As a result of his initiative, leadership and determination the enemy did not succeed in destroying the bridge.  The manner in which he employed his track, redistributed his resources, and adjusted supporting artillery fires under the austere circumstances demonstrated that he is  an example of men who are "Brave and Bold".  Staff Sergeant Bandy received the Silver Star for his actions.
                   (7)  When the enemy attack had terminated, the Binh Son District Chief and the Senior American Advisor coordinated the medical evacuation and security of the compound.  At approximately 0715 hours, two Korean platoons arrived at the compound.  Shortly thereafter the two APC's from the bridge arrived.  Two of the injured men with the APC's were evacuated along with 30 to 40 personnel who were wounded in the compound and three of the eight advisors.  One APC departed the compound and returned to the bridge to organize for a sweep of the area locating 14 enemy bodies.  The nearest body was approximately 75 meters from the position where the APC's had been firing.  They also found the location where the enemy had set-up a 57mm recoilless rifle, 81mm mortars, and several machine 
gun nests.  Twenty-five lbs of explosives were recovered near the Binh Son Bridge; these explosives were most probably intended to be used to destroy the bridge.
                   (8) Throughout the attack, gunships and the 1st Bn, 14 Arty engaged suspected mortar positions and other targets in support of the APC's and Binh Son Compound.  Battery C fired one battery of three rounds at coordinates BS 64979568 and suppressed the enemy automatic weapons and small arms fire for a period of 3 to 4 minutes.  Later, Battery C fired a battery of three rounds at coordinates BS 64979568 and once again the small arms fire ceased.  Twice battery A, fired a battery of  six rounds at coordinates BS 589920 (0359 hours and 0403 hours): each time suppressing the enemy's small arms fire.  At 0600 hours the battalion fired a TOT on suspected enemy locations at coordinates 550907, 550913,
570907 and 570914: these fires were requested by Binh Son.  A total of  624 rounds of artillery ammunition was fired in support of the Binh Son Defense.  Subsequent aerial reconnaissance and patrolling located 41 Viet Cong bodies, probably a result of artillery fires.  The enemy's ability to evacuate his
dead from the battle field made it impossible to determine how many Viet Cong were killed or wounded by the continuous fires of the artillery and gunships.
               c.  Subsequent Operations.
                   (1)  Throughout the Binh Son attack the Brigade TOC was kept abreast of the situation by the 1-6 Inf which had established communications with the Binh Son advisor's and the ROK Marine Brigade
located south of Binh Son.  The Brigade also monitored all traffic from the two tracks at Binh Son.  The S3, 1-6 Inf, contacted the ROK Brigade and requested that they establish blocking positions north and east of their locations (south and east of Binh Son District).  The ROK's agreed and established blocking positions as shown on inclosure #5, operation overlay.
                  (2)  Although the Binh Son Advisors had requested that the Brigade employ relief forces within that area, the Brigade could not because the Binh Son Military District Headquarters was not within the
Americal Division TAOR.  The ROK's had planned to send relief elements to cover approaches south of Binh Son.  The Brigade was prepared and requested permission from the Americal Division to enter the area based on the Binh Son Advisor request.  The Americal Division decided not to grant permission to enter the area; this would have had to be obtained from higher headquarters.  The Brigade Commander elected to employ elements of the 1-6 and 1-52 Infantry Battalions within the southern portion of  their AO's; to establish blocking positions, and to increase patrolling and ambush operations in order to destroy the enemy as he withdrew from Binh Son.
                    (3) 1st Bn, 6th Infantry.  In preparing to deploy his battalion near the Binh Son area, the Commanding Officer alerted element of his battalion for the mission and informed the Brigade TOC of his plans.  At 0510 hours the battalion commander deployed Company E and one platoon to Nuc Mau to join with the remainder of H Troop, 17th Cav which was moving from the Brigade base camp area to the Binh Son Bridge area.  Company B prepared to deploy by combat assault to a blocking position, located at
BS 546904 for subsequent movement east  on order.  Company C, which was deployed in the Brigade's Reconnaissance Zone (coord BS 4689), would be extracted from that zone and employed in blocking position vic BS 5089 along the Tra Bong River.  At 0800 hours the battalion implemented the
above plans as shown on inclosure #5.  During a search of their areas, elements of Company B 1-6 Inf battalion found one VC KIA with Chi-Com grenades and a litter made from a poncho.  Later the company found ten individual fighting bunkers and three threeman bunkers at BS 531901 that had been used within the past 24 hour period.  Company E found five sampans containing explosives in the vicinity of coord BS 582913.  In response to a request from the Binh Son advisor for medical assistance1-6 Inf dispatched three Field Ambulances (FLA) and the battalion S-5 to assist in the civil affairs effort.  Enroute one of the FLAs hit a mine emplaced on the road (coord 585950). The Battalion S5, Captain Groon, was killed instantly and three other US personnel were injured.
                    (4) 1st Bn, 52nd Infantry.  The Brigade Commander directed the Commanding Officer 1-52 Inf to establish blocking positions north of the Tra Bong River along the southern boundary of the 1-52 AO.  (See inclosure #5).  Battalion elements were established within blocking positions by 0800 hours, and within a 35 minute period had killed the first Viet Cong and captured two others attempting to evade.  The Battalion was then directed to sweep the area and to set up blocking positions vic
BS640960.  At 1200 hours the 2nd Platoon, Company A, engaged eight to ten enemy soldiers at coordinates BS 671992 armed with one automatic weapon and two rifles.  Contact was broken five minutes later resulting in four individuals detained.
               d.  4 December 1967.
                    (1) Throughout the day elements of the Brigade conttinued offensive operations against increased enemy activity.  Multiple patrols, ambushes and water patrols were used.  Road clearing operations were conducted in the Brigade TAOR.  Convoy escorts were conducted on Hwy 1 from Quang Ngai to Tam Ky.  Spot road checks were conducted in coordination with GVN National Police.  The Brigade increased its offensive activities in areas suspected of containing enemy troops.
                    (2) The enemy occasionally employed harassing fire at outposts and bunkers, and installed anti-personnel and vehicle mines along the road.  He increased his terrorist attacks on local villages
and set eight to ten fires in the Nuc Mau Village.  Later during the day the enemy increased his movement activities using sampans and boats.  At 0400 hours the 1st platoon, Company B, 1-52nd Inf observed eleven or twelve armed Viet Cong in a boat at coord BS 635952 going North to South.  The boat was allowed to get within fifty meters of their location to better observe and engage the enemy.  In this engagement the majority of the enemy were either killed or wounded.  An obstacle in the water pre-
vented the unit from getting to the boat; however, the unit used artillery illumination to hinder enemy evacuation of his dead.
                   (3) At 2010 hours, 1/B/1-52 Inf observed approximately 10 to 15 boats at coord.  BS 647970 going up and down the coast.  Some of the boats had lights, while others did not.  It appeared that the boats were using lights to signal each other.  Permission was obtained to engage the boats with small arms fire and artillery.  Seven boats were sunk and personnel from the remaining boats escaped on the far side of  the river vicinity BS 647972.  At approximately 1935 hours, C/1-52 Inf engaged five Viet Cong at coordinates BS 629022 and killed one.  The dead Viet Cong had four grenades and documents.  Company C engaged another small group of VC at 1955 hours and reported another VC KIA.
               e.  5 December 1967.
                   (1) Throughout the day offensive operations continued in addition to patrols, ambushes and water patrol activities.  A search was made of the area where the enemy boat had been engaged on the previous day.  Four of the twelve enemy engaged at BS 632955 were located in addition to some grenades, ammunition, documents and one carbine CIA.
                   (2) In one contact, coordinates BS 525939, 1-6 Inf engaged one Viet Cong with small arms fire resulting in one VC KIA (C) with webgear, medical supplies and documents captured.

      13.  (C) Results:
               a.  Enemy Losses:
                   3 December             19 KIA (C) *
                   4 December              6 KIA (C)      8 KIA (P)
                   5 December              1 KIA (C) 
                                          26 KIA (C)      8 KIA (P)
                  Detainees       6
                  Boats           7 destroyed, 5 captured with explosives

    * It is estimated that 1-14th Artillery Bn fires killed approximately 41 or more enemy soldiers, only three enemy KIA can be accredited to the Brigade body count because the remaining dead were not within the 
Brigade's TAOR.  Subsequent intelligence indicates that the total enemy killed was estimated to be in excess of 100 and wounded in excess of 250.

               b.  Friendly losses:  (198th LIB)

                   1 KHA
                   6 WHA
 
   14.  (C) Commander's Analysis.
       a.  The missions contained in paragraph 10 of this report could  not be classified as specified missions, but rather implied missions from Americal Division.  The *implied* tasks were determined to be essent-
ial to the accomplishment of the Brigade's overall mission.  The implied tasks were derived from an analysis of increased enemy activity within the Brigade's TAOR and the possibility of an enemy attack on the Binh Son Military District Headquarters.  Both the Brigade and the Binh Son Military District have the Tra Bong River as a common boundary; consequently any enemy activity near this boundary was of mutual concern.  The Brigade normally secures Highway 1 from the northern extremity of the Binh Son Bridge (Chau O) BS 596928 to Tam Ky, the northern terminus of the Brigade TAOR.  Increased intelligence reports indicated that an enemy attack on the Binh Son Military District and Bridges was imminent.  It was in the 
best interest of the Brigade to position several Armored Personnel Carriers near the northern end of the bridge.  The Binh Son Advisory Team had also requested that the Brigade assist the local PF force in the 
defense of the bridge.  Positioning the APC's at the bridge also covered a possible avenue of approach from within the Brigade TAOR.
               b.  Once the attack had begun, the Brigade acted to deny the enemy the opportunity to withdraw through the Brigade TAOR.  Possible avenues of egress were covered through deployment of the 1-6 Inf and 1-52nd Inf in blocking positions along the southern boundary of their AO's.  The battalion's movement into these positions was accomplished with a minimum of internal tactical adjustments.
               c.  The reaction of the 1-6 Inf was excellent.  The manner in which they established communications with the ROK Marine Brigade and kept them informed of the Binh Son situation, contributed to the ROK's employment of relief elements.
               d.  The enemy attack on 3 December could be considered a valuable training vehicle.  It provided the Brigade TOC an opportunity to react to a developing situation which required immediate reaction and coordination which was essential because of the multiple boundaries (ROK, ARVN, & US) which the Free World Forces shared.  Employment of artillery direct support fires, gunships and Air Force flareships was  contingent upon the effectiveness of the required coordination between the Free World Armed Forces.  The Brigades reactions, planning and  execution of subsequent operations in support of Binh Son was successful.

7 Incl                             
  1 - Overlay, Probable Enemy       
Scheme of Maneuver                  
  2 - Consolidated Intelligence
Reports 
  3 - Illustration of APC's
Activities
  4 - Diagram of Binh Son Military 
District Compound
  5 - Operations Overlay
  6 - Map, Operations Area

DISTRIBUTION:
   5 - CG Americal Division
  10 - CO, 198th LIB
   5 - CO, 1-6 Inf Bn
   5 - CO, 1-46 Inf Bn
   5 - CO, 1-52 Inf Bn
   5 - CO, 1-14 Arty Bn
   5 - CO, H Trp, 17th Cav
 
 

NND 873541                                      CONFIDENTIAL

AVDF-BCB                                                                                                             16 February 1968

                        INTELLIGENCE BUILDUP
(C) The following intelligence reports collected by 635th Military Intelligence Detachment indicated that an enemy attack on the Binh Son Military District Headquarters was imminent.
   
  a.  The Americal Division Intelligence Summary dated 21 Nov 67 stated that, enemy documents, captured on 2 Nov by the 198th LIB, revealed various enemy activities which were to be conducted by Viet Cong units of the Quang  Ngai Province.  One of the documents, dated 5 Oct 67, indicated that the 406th Sapper Bn would attack Nui Tra and Binh Son, and possibly Binh Son District.

   b.  Agent reports from the Binh Son District:
       (1) 18 Nov 67, AR #3: There is a Viet Cong guerilla squad combined with two sapper cells, strength 18, at coordinates BS 570980.  The combined force was armed with: One B40, two AK50's, Six carbines, mines and explosive charges.  Whenever FREE WORLD FORCES operated in their area, the VC force would move to coordinates BS 572909 and then to Binh Tuy Village.  At night they often moved to coordinates BS 594927 to collect friendly information at the Chau O Bridge (coordinates BS 597927).  The mission of the VC forces was  to sabotage the Chau O Bridge (Binh Son Bridge)  sometime between 18 and 22 November to commemorate the establishment of the SVN Liberation Front.
      (2) 22 Nov 67, AR #8: The 21st and 95th Sapper Companies and at  least one Company of the 48th Bn, would attack Binh Son District Headquarters between 22 Nov and 10 Dec 67.  The contents of these intelligence documents conformed with the winter offensive plans outlined in earlier VC documents
One Company of the 48th Bn moved east of this location with the mission con-current to that indicated here.  This was the first of captured documents which mentioned special locations and dates.
     (3) 25 Nov 67, AR #11: The 108 VC Bn moved from Tay Phuoc to Ca Dao hamlet, vic BS 488932.  They cut wood to build a replica of the Chau O Bridge (Binh Son Bridge) and trained with mortars and grenades.  They disclosed that their mission was to attack the Chau O Bridge and Binh Son District HQ's
within the next few nights.
     (4)  25 Nov 67, AR#12: PW named Bui Thi My was brought to Binh Son by the 1/52nd Inf, 198th LIB.  She was a nurse for the 95th Sapper Company. She was captured in the vicinity of BS 599923 and provided the following information: The 95th Sapper Company is commanded by Vo Phat (Alias Niem).
The 95th Sapper Company combined with two platoons of the P31 Company located vic BS 690912 - BS 684906 - BS 684915.  The strength of the combined force was 195, and they were armed with two 60mm mortars, two 30 Cal. MG's, eight BAR's and five B40's.  Their mission was to attack the Chau O Bridge and the Binh Son District Headquarters prior to 15 Dec 67.
     (5) 26 Nov 67, AR #13: From 20 Nov to Dec 67, the 81st and 83d VC Bns would attack the Binh Son District Headquarters and Quang Ngai Airport. They would also attempt to destroy a friendly battalion.  The C-21 and C-95 Sapper Companies and an element of the 48th Bn would attack Binh Son District HQ's and the Chau O Bridge.  A company of the X-20 Sapper Bn would attack Ba To District while guerilla forces would sabotage roads and bridges.
      (6) 26 Nov, AR #14: Two unidentified companies were located in Binh Ky Village (BS678937 to BS 680935 to BS 675945 to BS 688916).  They were armed with two 81mm Mortars, two MG's, fourteen BAR's.  Their mission was to attack O Song Bridge, Binh Phuoc Refugee Camp, Chau O Bridge, and to mortar Binh Son District HQ's from 26 Nov to 05 Dec 67.
      (7) 27 Nov 67, AR#16; The 81st VC Bn has moved to BS 445835 with the mission to attack Binh Son District Headquarters from 27 Nov to 07 Dec 67.
      (8) 30 Nov 67, AR#19: A VC Bn was formed for operational purposes.  This Bn was named VC Worksite 5 and had five companies located in the following areas: One unidentified company is located in Khan Van, BS 687804 - BS 691807.  The 95th Company is located in An Sen, BS727890, An Bang BS 715883, and Phu Than BS 703876.  Two reconnaissance cells are at An Bang BS 715883.  The 48th
Company is located in Phu Vinh, BS 680837 and Duyen Loc BS 677843.  This company was armed with one 81mm mortar, one HMG and twelve BAR's.  The 21st Company is armed with one 57RR, heavy machine guns and ten Browning Automatic Rifles.  The 31st Company is armed with two AK 47's, one DK 40, one 57mm recoi-less rifle and one heavy machine gun.  They are jointly located in Binh Ky
village, BS 701928.  The strength of the battalion is unknown as they hide in the mountains and conceal themselves in tunnels during the day.  The battalion's mission is to combine and attack the Chau O Bridge and Binh Son HQ's within the near future.
          (9) 1 Dec 67, AR#22: The 21 VC company with a strength of 85 is located at BS 715865.
         (10) On 26 Nov, an information report was received which stated that on 21 Nov 67, an unidentified VC unit combined with the P-31 Co and some local Guerrillas, with approximately 300 men.  They were located between Phuoc Thuan BS 575991 and Loc Thanh BS 480895 and were commanded by Nguyen An Than (alias Nap), Le Van Duc, and Le Quang.  The combined unit was armed with one 82mm mortar, two 60mm mortars, two 30 cal MG's, one 57mm RR, and automatic rifles and individual weapons.  The units also had two PRC 10 radios.  They were black, gray and blue uniforms.  Each person carried a four day ration and two days supply of fried rice and dried beef.  The units were attempting to recruit approximately twenty five laborers from each village in western Binh Son District.  Their mission was to mortar Binh Son HQ's, destroy the Chau O Bridge, conduct harassment operations in the vicinity of Binh Son's HQ's and capture RVN members between 25 and 30 Nov 67.
       (11) 17 Nov 67, National Police AR #20: The 95th VC Company was located at Binh Ky, vicinity BS 682945 - BS 674945, their plan was to disturb the Chau O town.
 

[Terms used in this report:  ]
Aero Scouts - Usually refers to B/123rd Avn Bn infantry platoon also known
     as "animals" of the Warlords.  F/8th Cav of 123rd Avn Bn technically
     had aero scouts but they usually were referenced as an element of 
     "Blue Ghosts".
AK-47 - Automatic rifle used by VC/NVA
AK-50 - NVA rifle
AO - Area of Operations
AWF - Automatic Weapons Fire.
BAR - Browning Automatic Rifle
Blue Ghost - F/8th Cav (Air Cav)
CAP - Combined Action Platoons (Marine program: Small groups of U.S.
      Marines were assigned to live in Vietnamese hamlets.  They trained
      advised and fought with Vietnamese Popular Force soldiers in small
      hamlets.)
Cheiu Hoi - Open Arms program accepted enemy back to the government
            of South Vietnam's side.
CIDG - Montagnard self defense forces lead by allied advisors.
CSW - Crew Served Weapon (weapon requiring more than one operator.)
IW - Individual Weapon.
LF - Local Force VC
MF - Main Force VC
Medevac - helicopter ambulance for wounded (A.K.A Dustoff)
Muskets - 176th AHC gunships
Minutemen - 176th AHC slicks
M-79 - American Grenade launcher (40mm)
KBA - Killed by artillery
KHA - Killed hostile action
KIA - Killed in Action
WHA - Wounded hostile action ((E) required evacuation (M) minor wounds)
WIA - Wounded in Action
MHA - Missing hostile action.
LRRP - Long Range Recon Patrol
CIA - Captured in Action
Chicom - Chinese Communist made equipment.
RPG - Rocket propelled grenade launcher - anti-tank weapon
RPD MG - Type of 7.62mm machinegun used by VC/NVA
SAF - Small Arms Fire
SKS - Rifle used by VC/NVA
TAOR - Tactical Area of Responsibility
USEF - Unknown Size Enemy Force
USMC - United States Marine Corps